Herodotus was correct in saying that male and female are separate in both date palms and fig trees. His description of caprification is reasonably accurate: caprifig syconia inhabited by wasps are hung in fig trees; the wasps enter new syconia with the result that the syconia remain on the tree until they ripen. His sole mistake was in assigning to the date the mechanical details of pollen transfer in figs. There is no wasp involved in the pollination of dates.

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THE MEANING OF ΘΡΑΣΟΣ IN ARISTOTLE'S *ETHICS*

Aristotle says that courage is a mean concerning fear and confidence (*EN* 1115a6–7 μεσότης . . . περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη; also at 1107a34); moreover, he defines fear and specifies its objects: fear is a painful passion whose object is danger or risk, the possibility of future evils. Unfortunately, nowhere does he define confidence or even indicate its relation to fear. Recent commentators have with good reason inferred that confidence is a pleasant emotion directed toward the same objects as fear. But, having defined confidence, a commentator must then relate both it and fear to courage; and here W. D. Ross, W. F. R. Hardie, and D. J. Allan have all created unnecessary complications. Thus Hardie follows Allan and sees fear and confidence as separate passions, each a continuum ranging from too much to not enough and each needing control.[1] Ross goes farther still and maintains that, not only are fear and confidence in this sense distinct emotions, but that courage actually contains two separate virtues, one concerned with fear and the other with confidence. Their reason for relating fear and confidence to courage in this way, making courage a mean concerning each, comes from a single paragraph (1115b24–34) where Aristotle talks about three vices between which courage is a mean—the cowardly feeling of too much fear, the nameless vice of feeling too little fear, and rashness, or feeling too confident.[2] Since it is hard to see how something can be a mean between three extremes, his commentators have concluded that there must be a fourth, unmentioned extreme to complete the possibilities; if there are four extremes, then courage must in fact be two virtues, one hitting the mean with respect to confidence,[3] or, at least, courage

1. *Aristotle's Ethical Theory* (Oxford, 1968), p. 140: "In Aristotle's account of courage two types of feelings are involved, fear and 'cheer' or love of danger. Both must be controlled. So, Ross suggests, we must substitute for Aristotle's trinity 'not one duality but two.' Courage is control of fear and cowardice the lack of control. Discretion is the control of cheer and rashness the lack of control. Again the distinction between virtue and continence disappears in this corrected version of Aristotle."

2. Aristotle says that the third vice is a nameless one, not only at 1115b24–34 but also at 1107b2, where he points out that many virtues and vices are nameless. The anonymous referee for this journal has noted that Aristotle does in fact refer to this vice by name, using ἀδεής at 1115a33 and ἄφοβος at 1117a19; he offers a persuasive reason why these terms cannot designate the vice of fearlessness: "Presumably in Greek usage these terms are so regularly commendatory that they are not available for use in a pejorative sense." The comments of the referee were most helpful throughout the paper.

3. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (London, 1949), p. 206.

must be a single virtue "involving appropriate, and intermediate, degrees of both these ranges of feeling."[4] But, if the paragraph where Aristotle lists three vices is put in the context of his entire treatment of courage, a quite different conclusion emerges about the meaning of confidence and its relation to fear and courage. Which reading one chooses is of some importance in developing a satisfactory account of the relation of a virtue to the passions which are its matter.

Aristotle discusses courage in chapters 6 through 9 of Book 3, and it is the argument of that section of the *Ethics* that provides the evidence for the meaning of confidence and its relation to courage. In general, the most striking thing about fear and confidence in Aristotle's treatment of courage is that fear is constantly, and confidence quite intermittently, under discussion. Chapter 6 begins by saying that courage is a mean with respect to fear and confidence, but the rest of the chapter (1115a10–b6) is concerned with delimiting the object of fear in courage properly so called (1115a32 *κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ' ἄν ἀνδρεῖος*) as opposed to those acts which are merely called courageous by metaphor (1115a16).[5] There is nothing here about either two continua of passion or two virtues.[6]

Chapter 7 shifts the focus of discussion from the object of courage, risks of a certain kind, to the reaction of the courageous man to the fearful; twice during this discussion Aristotle says, apparently as an afterthought, "and similarly for the objects of confidence." The first time, he says that the terrors that men can endure differ in magnitude and degree, and similarly with respect to situations inspiring confidence (*ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα*); the second time, he says that error arises from fearing what one ought not to fear, and similarly for confidence (*ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα*). In both of these cases, he is talking not about the *emotion* of confidence but about the *situations* which provoke it (*τὰ θαρραλέα*). If confidence is really a separate emotion, one must wonder why Aristotle never defines it, as he does so carefully for fear and fear of death in battle (ch. 6), and why he should introduce *θράσος* into the discussion of courage in such a casual way. Now, in chapter 7 (1115b24–1116a3), comes the single passage which makes people want to divide courage into two virtues, or at least a virtue about two different means. The coward stands on one side of the courageous man, exceeding

4. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory*, p. 145: "As D. J. Allan correctly states, Aristotle treats [fear and cheer] 'not as opposite points on a single scale, so related that to exceed in one is to fall short in the other (like hot and cold), but as distinct emotions each admitting of excess, moderation, and deficiency.' (Allan, p. 173). Aristotle does not say that courage lies in a ratio between amounts or degrees of fear and amounts or degrees of cheer. He describes it rather as involving appropriate, and intermediate, degrees of both these ranges of feeling."

5. *Τὰ φοβερά* can mean the fearful, the dangerous, or risks. We fear what is dangerous, and dangers are the apprehensive side of risks. All emotional terms can range, both in Greek and in English, in their specification of the object of the emotion from the internal accusative, i.e., the object as content contained in the emotion as felt, to the objective correlative, i.e., the object as the thing outside of us, which causes the emotion. This range in how we describe the object of an emotion, how we translate *τὰ φοβερά* and *τὰ θαρραλέα*, shows that neither a dictionary nor even a theory of emotion will by itself solve our problem of the relation of fear and confidence in the *Ethics*.

6. Confidence is mentioned twice in ch. 6, but in both cases it is assumed to be an emotion that the truly or metaphorically courageous man feels. "Some men who are cowards in war are liberal with money, and face loss of fortune *εὐθαρσῶς*" (1115a21). "Nor is a man courageous if *θαρρεῖ* when about to be flogged" (1115a23). Both these remarks show that fear and confidence have the same object, and that the courageous man feels confident, but they do not help to understand the relation between fear and confidence.

courage by feeling too much fear, while on the other side of courage are two vices, rashness, which is overconfident, and the nameless vice of not feeling enough fear. It is my concern here to see what happens to this passage when it is put into the context of the entire discussion of courage.

Immediately following the passage where Aristotle names the three vices, he says two further things about courage and its vices that need to be considered. First, as he does with other virtues, he compares courage, as a mean, with *two* extreme vices, rashness and cowardice, proceeding as though the third, nameless, vice had never been cited: he says that the rash man, the coward, and the courageous man are all concerned with the same objects—additional evidence that confidence and fear have the same object—but that the rash man and the coward exceed and fall short (*ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν*). The plural verbs suggest that each rash man and coward both exceeds and falls short. Second, he says that rashness ends up being cowardice; the rash are impetuous and eager before the danger comes, but they hang back at the critical moment. On the two-virtue or two-continua theories, there is no reason directly connected to their natures for rashness to turn into cowardice.

In chapter 8, which is concerned with five "tropes" of courage, or noncourageous ways of doing courageous acts, Aristotle talks about the role of fear, but never that of confidence, in such acts of courage. The only reference to confidence in chapter 8 comes when Aristotle says, as he does elsewhere, that it is the emotion the courageous man feels (1117a12). The significance of this claim will be explored later in this paper.

The relation between fear and confidence is made more explicit in chapter 9, explicit enough to suggest a different relation between them than that offered by Ross, Hardie, and Allan. The courageous man is concerned, Aristotle states at the beginning of the chapter, with fear and confidence, but more with fear. After that opening statement, one could expect the rest of the chapter to be about fear and confidence, but it is not; instead, it is entirely about pleasure and pain, and their place in courage: just as courage is concerned with fear and confidence, but more with fear, the courageous man feels both pain and pleasure, but more often pain.

The passions are the things in the soul accompanied by pleasure or pain (1105b24); the structure of the argument of Book 3, chapters 6–9, suggests the following hypothesis about fear and confidence. First, chapters 6 and 7 suggest by the offhand way in which confidence is mentioned without discussion or development that confidence has the same objects as fear. Aristotle talks about the occasion for courage indifferently as the fearful (*τὰ φοβερά*) or as situations calling for fear or confidence.[7] Second, if the objects of fear and confidence are the same, then the only difference between them can be the other component of an emotion, namely, pleasure and pain (1105b24).[8] Chapter 9 seems to verify the

7. See the uses of "and similarly for confidence" discussed above, p. 229; in addition, see 1103b17: "By acting in dangerous situations (*ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς*) and forming a habit (*ἐθιζόμενοι*) of fear or confidence (*φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν*) we become courageous or cowardly (*οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί*).

8. In discussing the emotions of fear and confidence, this account has followed Aristotle in defining emotions by their objects (as he does for fear in ch. 6 of Bk. 6) and the pleasure or pain which accompanies them. An object plus pleasure or pain is what an emotion is. Emotions are also natural but contingent tendencies to act in certain ways, but this property is distinct from their essence as emotions; moral

present hypothesis, with its opening sentence contrasting fear and confidence and the rest of the chapter contrasting pain and pleasure. This pair of emotions with a single object requires a single virtue, courage. The complexities of a pair of emotions, identical in object and differing in pleasure and pain, require a complex meaning for the idea of a virtue hitting a mean, standing well with respect to the passions.[9]

Why, then, if courage is a single virtue, are there three vices associated with it?[10] If Aristotle had not posited three extremes about fear and confidence, no one ever would have suggested that there are two continua, much less two virtues. Aristotle's point can be put this way. People respond emotionally to the presence of danger; any emotion is accompanied by pleasure or pain—and both painful and pleasant emotions admit of degrees. Fear is the primary emotional response to danger, but a decrease in that painful emotion is not necessarily or automatically an increase in the pleasant feeling of confidence: as Allan rightly says, the emotions of fear and confidence are not related as hot and cold are, so "that to exceed in one is to fall short in the other."[11] Moreover, an increase in confidence can even coexist with an increase in fear; in a highly dangerous situation one can imagine heightened feelings of both pleasure and pain. Hence, cowardice, rashness, and the nameless third vice of too little fear are distinct ways of going wrong. The attitude of having too little confidence does not come in as a fourth vice distinct from cowardice because, as will be shown, it is hard to see how too little confidence could exist apart from too much fear.

But this only shows that it is possible for there to be exactly three vices for a single virtue; showing that there should be just three for courage is a different matter. In chapter 8 of Book 2 Aristotle says that courage is more like rashness than it is like cowardice, and that remark offers a clue to the relation among courage, its emotions, and its vices. Emotions lead to action in two ways. An emotion is, on the one hand, a natural but contingent tendency to act in a certain way. Thus, fear is, as Ross says, a "tendency to avoid dangers."[12] But an emotion can lead to action in a second, less immediate way. It is not only a tendency to

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training alters not the emotions but the attached tendencies. Thus, Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 206, should not define fear and confidence as the "tendency to avoid danger [and] a tendency to rush into it." The actualizations of those tendencies are vices; in courage the tendencies, but not the passions, are, in Ross' terms, controlled.

9. W. F. R. Hardie, "'Magnanimity' in Aristotle's *Ethics*," *Phronesis* 23 (1978): 63: "The hint that not all ethical virtues are means in the same way is confirmed at least in the case of justice which is found not to be a mean 'in the same way as the other virtues' (1133b32–33)." Therefore, the "continua" with respect to which they are means are not all continua in the same way. See also *Eud. Eth.* 1221b10–16 for elaboration of the claim that virtue is a mean on a continuum more complex than a simple line: "These modes of emotion are divided into species designated according to their difference in respect of time or intensity or in regard to one of the objects that cause the emotions. I mean, for instance, that a man is called quick-tempered from feeling the emotion of anger sooner than he ought, harsh and passionate from feeling it more than he ought, bitter from having a tendency to cherish his anger, violent and abusive owing to the acts of retaliation to which his anger gives rise."

10. The three vices of cowardice, rashness, and having too little fear are listed also in 1107b1–4, the passage in which Aristotle gives his *schema* of virtues and vices. This appearance of the same three vices gives some, but not much, additional probability to my claim that the omission of the fourth vice is not as accidental as Ross and others would have it.

11. Allan, *The Philosophy of Aristotle* (Oxford, 1952), p. 145.

12. *Aristotle*, p. 206.

act, but can also be the material taken up and informed by a ἕξις προαιρετική and thereby actualized as a deliberately desired action; fear, as the painful apprehension of dangers, is the material cause of the courageous man's decision to stay and fight. Cowardice, as a vice, makes habitual and part of a man's character the natural reaction to the fearful, and as such it is the extreme which courage seeks, in the first place, to avoid.

Courage results from refusing to make the natural reaction to fear into one's habitual reaction and desiring instead to face the dangers. In addition to courage as a deliberate and purposeful opposite, cowardice has two emotional opposites: rashness, the vice of having too much confidence, and the nameless vice of feeling too little fear.[13]

The derivation of courage as the virtuous opposite of the natural vice of cowardice and of rashness and the nameless state as the two vicious opposites permit us to see why courage is a mean among three extremes and why it seems to be a virtue concerned with two different emotions. While fear is a natural emotion in the face of dangers, confidence is a derivative emotion, formed in reaction to fear. Fear exists because the anticipation of possible future pains is itself painful; why should, and how could, danger ever be the object of a pleasant apprehension? Is it not because this fear is ignoble, and, in response, the love of danger is formed by reaction to the ignoble pain? As Pears says, we would never pursue dangers if we did not conceive fear as bad.[14] And if fear is a basic emotion while confidence is a derivative one, then a fourth vice, feeling too little confidence, would mean, emotionally, forming the opposite of an opposite, a derivative emotion twice removed from its natural base. Intellectually we should have no difficulty constructing such a complex idea, but emotionally such a convolution is, although not impossible, unlikely. Fear and confidence are not only two emotions sharing a single object, they are a pair of emotions, part of a single continuum of excess and defect, a continuum presided over by a single virtue and bounded by three vices.

As was pointed out earlier, Aristotle calls the courageous man confident (1115a21, 1115a23, 1117a12), and confidence is the pleasure felt by the courageous man. The virtue of courage and the vice of rashness are both opposed to cowardice, and they both involve confidence; the similarity and the contrast between rashness and courage shows in more detail the relation between a virtue and the emotions it is about.[15] Confidence, the pleasant anticipation of risks, can come about in two ways. One of them is the confidence which leads to rashness, and the other is the confidence associated with perfect courage. In the first case, it seems to be aversion to cowardice that engenders the pleasant anticipation—hence, Aristotle's

13. J. L. Stocks' reflection on courage, "The Test of Experience," *Mind* 28 (1919): 79–80, provides an illustration of the two opposites of cowardice. Soldiers, he reports, can be quite cheerful in the face of rifle bullets, while against shelling, fearlessness is the best we can hope for. If the feelings of fear and confidence are thus independent of each other, then their excesses, their vices, are similarly independent.

14. It is true that not all fear is ignoble (1115a10–14). But the only fears which we should not overcome are those connected with our own bad actions; we should fear doing something shameful. Cf. D. F. Pears, "Aristotle's Analysis of Courage," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 3 (1978): 280.

15. One must distinguish between confidence (θράσος), a feeling, and rashness (θρασύς), a vice. Vices are not feelings but ways of being related well or badly to the feelings (1105b26 ἕξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς). Θράσος is not the only feeling lexically related to a vice: anger (ὀργή) is similarly related to irascibility (ὀργιλότης) (1108a4–9).

remark that rash men seem courageous but really are cowards, since they really feel the emotions of the coward—whereas the confidence associated with courage comes from the man's own character and not from avoiding something else. Thus, rash confidence is against the grain of the rash man's cowardly character, while courageous confidence is the pleasure of acting according to one's nature.[16]

The appearance of confidence in two places, first, as an emotional reaction to fear, transforming a painful emotion into a pleasant one, and then as the concomitant of virtue, is of great ethical significance. Pleasure, throughout the *Ethics*, is regarded in two ways. Pleasure is the opposite of pain; men normally infer that if something brings pain, its opposite will bring pleasure. Here pleasure and pain are signs of, and components of, the passions. On the other hand, pleasure is unimpeded activity and is a sign of activity. Here pleasure is not known by its contrary, pain; rather, each pleasure is known by its correlative activity. Both dimensions of pleasure are explored throughout the *Ethics*, and their interrelations occasion some of the complications in the argument. Here, in the discussion of courage and its vices, both senses of pleasure come in. Confidence is a pleasant passion, the opposite of the painful passion of fear. Rashness is based on excessive confidence. But the courageous man is confident (1115b29–34); courageous action sometimes is accompanied by the pleasure of unimpeded activity. Since the activity here is facing risks cheerfully, without hesitation or fear, the accompanying pleasure is confidence. Hence, the rash man imitates and tries to be the courageous man by having the right feeling, confidence, instead of through the right choice. Pleasure, including the pleasure of confidence, accompanies both passion and action; the two dimensions of pleasure are easy to confuse—easy, that is, for everyone except the virtuous man.

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16. 1117a34–b17. See esp. 1117b15–17: "Thus, it is not true of every virtue that its *energeia* is pleasant, save insofar as (*πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον*) it attains its end." For an analysis of this surprising claim of Aristotle, see my "Aristotle on Virtue and Pleasure," in *The Greeks and the Good Life*, ed. D. Depew (Indianapolis, 1980), pp. 157–76.

LUCRETIUS ON THE INEFFICACY OF THE MEDICAL ART: 6. 1179 AND 6. 1226–38

Some commentators, such as H. A. J. Munro and C. Bailey,[1] assume a close and immediate dependence of Lucretius on Thucydides' account of the Great Plague at Athens in 431 B.C. and thus conclude that the poet mistranslates,

1. H. A. J. Munro (ed.), *T. Lucreti Cari libri sex*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1864), pp. 406–17; C. Bailey (ed.), *T. Lucreti Cari libri sex*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1947), 1:27–28, 3:1723–44. Cf. A. Ernout and L. Robin (eds.), *T. Lucreti Cari libri sex*, vol. 3 (Paris, 1925), pp. 359–60, who are persuaded by Lucretius' divergencies from the Thucydidean text to postulate the existence of an intermediary account which the poet followed; W. Lück, *Die Quellenfrage im 5. und 6. Buch des Lukrez* (Ph.D. diss., Breslau, 1932), pp. 175–82, goes so far as to assign such an account to Demetrius of Laconia, an Epicurean physician of the second century B.C. All such arguments, however, have not proved convincing. See E. Reitzenstein's review of Lück, *Gnomon* 9 (1933): 542–49; Bailey, *T. Lucreti Cari*, 1: 26–28.